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I. HENRY MARK HOLZER
When we talk about national security or national security inter-
ests, we are referring to the government's legitimate concern with
defending itself against violent overthrow or subjugation by domestic
subversion or external aggression. Indeed, the term "national
defense" derives meaning and texture from cases interpreting the
Espionage Act.'
I want to remind you at the outset that the title of the panel is
* Floyd Abrams is a partner in the New York law firm of Cahill, Gordon & Reindel. He
has taught courses at Yale Law School, Columbia Graduate School of Journalism, and
Columbia Law School. He has argued many cases relating to freedom of the press before the
Supreme Court and has received numerous awards for his work. He is also the author of
numerous articles in newspapers, magazines and professional journals.
** Henry Mark Holzer is a faculty member at Brooklyn Law School where he has taught
constitutional law courses, appellate advocacy, and legal ethics. Prior to teaching, he was in
private practice, specializing in constitutional, administrative, and general appellate law, where
he was involved in many precedent-setting cases. Professor Holzer is the author of numerous
books, articles and essays on a variety of legal issues.
*** Don Oberdorfer is a Pulitzer Prize winning reporter for the Washington Post. He is
the Post's Diplomatic Correspondent assigned to the State Department. He taught at
Princeton University as the Ferris Professor of Journalism in 1977, 1982, and 1986.
**** Richard K. Willard is a partner in the Washington, D.C. law firm of Steptoe &
Johnson. He served as Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Division of the U.S.
Department of Justice, 1983-1988. He also served as a judicial clerk for Justice Harry A.
Blackmun of the, Supreme Court of the United States and Judge Anthony M. Kennedy of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
1. Ch. 645, §§ 793-794, 62 Stat. 736-37 (1948) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 793-
794 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
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"The First Amendment and National Security." Therefore, there are
a lot of things that we will not talk about, such as loyalty tests, travel
restrictions, domestic surveillance, and the acquisition of information.
Rather, we will speak about the disclosure or the dissemination of
material as it relates to a first amendment right of free speech and
press.2 Indeed, because the topic is the first amendment and national
security, I am not going to be talking about things like dirty pictures,
but rather I am going to be talking about things as a matter of
survival.
The United States of America has national security and national
defense concerns because the world in the 20th century, as well as in
the foreseeable future, is an extremely dangerous place. There are
people out there who want to hurt us-from the Soviet empire and
the Iranian fanatics to freelance gangsters like Qadhafi and Abu
Nidal.
The nondisclosure aspect of our national security and national
defense concerns is directly related to our survival. Many reasons are
given for our espionage laws, and for our official secrets and acts. Our
allies will not deal with us, unless they can rely on us. When you
exhaust the laundry list of practical concerns-and it is a long one-it
comes down very simply to a question of national survival. Yet
despite certain disclosures which actually and potentially threaten our
survival, there are all sorts of people with differing motives who wish
to reveal, and who have revealed, a variety of information to various
recipients. They are spies like Colonel Abel, 3 self-styled patriots like
Daniel Ellsberg,4 journalists like Woodward,5 traitors like the Walk-
ers6 and the Rosenbergs,7 zealots like Pollard,8 former government
employees like Pelton,9 Snepp,10 Morison, I I Turner,
1 2 and Agee.1 3 If
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. Rudolf Abel, convicted of espionage activities in the United States, was given to the
Soviet Union in exchange for downed American U-2 pilot Gary Powers in 1962. See Abel for
Powers, TIME, Feb. 16, 1962.
4. While employed by a Defense Department consultant, Ellsberg leaked the Pentagon
Papers to a reporter for the New York Times. See Abrams, The Pentagon Papers a Decade
Later, N.Y. Times, June 7, 1981, § 6 (Magazine), at 25.
5. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
6. John, Arthur and Michael Walker, and Jerry Alfred Whitworth were participants in
the "Walker Family Spy Ring," which sold classified U.S. Navy information to the Soviet
Union. See, e.g., United States v. Whitworth, 856 F.2d 1268 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Spies
Come to Judgment, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 11, 1985, at 13.
7. See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
8. Jonathan J. Pollard, a former United States naval intelligence analyst, was sentenced
to life in prison, in 1987, for espionage activities he performed on behalf of Israel. See Jay
Pollard's Peculiar Tale, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, June 1, 1987, at 23.
9. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 43:61
19881 FIRST AMENDMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY 63
you like, you can put Agee on the list of traitors. They are politicians
like Pat Leahy, 4 or, as I like to think of him, "Leaky" Pat Leahy.
Their motives vary: anti-Americanism, pro-communism, polit-
ical advantage, "scholarship," power, ego, greed, and fame. The
information released runs the gamut: codes, surveillance, covert
projects, atomic bomb secrets, technical information, reports like the
Pentagon Papers,15 and something I will come back to called the Spe-
cial Navy Control Program.1 6 The recipients of all of this information
are usually our enemies, ultimately the USSR, and, of course, some-
times even our allies.
How does it work? First, there is acquisition. A prospective dis-
closer may somehow obtain material either illegally, or legally,
through employment. In other words, he steals it, or he gets it from a
thief. At this point in the scenario, it is a general criminal law prob-
lem. The motive may, or may not, mitigate the theft, but the first
amendment does not yet approve of stealing. I have not seen the
advance sheets, nor have I read some of what our distinguished
Supreme Court Justices have said on the subject lately, but as of yes-
terday, at least, the first amendment did not protect stealing. Today,
however, we are not concerned with acquisition.
The second stage is that the government sometimes learns that
something is about to be disclosed,, as in the Pentagon Papers situa-
tion. At that point, the issue of prior restraint arises. I will address
that in a few moments.
The third stage is disclosure. Disclosure to whom? Disclosure
may be to the KGB or the GRU, to the resident at the Soviet Consu-
late, to the New York Times or the Washington Post, to the Daily
Worker or Newsweek Magazine, to Israel, or Dan Rather. Because a
Julius Rosenberg loves communism, or because a Pat Leahy wants to
be a big shot, or because a Philip Agee hates America, or because the
Walkers need money, we lose secrets and become even more at risk.
11. Samuel Loring Morison, a former military intelligence analyst, was convicted for
violation of the Espionage Act for the unauthorized sale of classified government documents to
a private British magazine. See United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1988), cert
denied, 109 S. Ct. 259 (1988).
12. Stansfield Turner, a former Navy Admiral and former Director of the CIA under
President Carter, authored SECRECY AND DEMOCRACY: THE CIA IN TRANSITION, which
describes his views of the CIA.
13. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
14. Patrick J. Leahy, a Democratic Senator from Vermont and former vice-chairman of
the Senate Intelligence Committee.
15. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam)
(commonly referred to as the Pentagon Papers case).
16. See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
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We do have somewhat of an arsenal to protect against harming
America's national security by disclosure of sensitive information. I
won't give you the laundry list, but suffice it to say that there are some
narrow, precise situations, like atomic energy, which are covered by
specific acts. The former CIA employee is covered by yet another set
of very narrow safeguards, such as the employment contract. There
is, of course, punishment for what I would like to call straight espio-
nage. Believe it or not, however, other than these and two other situa-
tions which I will mention in a moment, that is it.
Another safeguard is 18 U.S.C. § 641,17 which covers theft and
embezzlement in the government. It is not an easy statute to use, in
regards to the disclosure of national security and national defense
information. The other weapon is a prior restraint preliminary
injunction, which was contemplated by Near v. Minnesota 8 and New
York Times Co. v. United States. 9 This, however, currently is a judi-
cial weapon. It is only something that can be sought and obtained, if
at all, from a court, and it does not rest on any statutory or significant
basis.
Where do we stand with regard to spies like Abel? Actually, we
are in pretty good shape. What about traitors like the Rosenbergs,
the Walkers, or Pelton? Again, we are in pretty good shape. What
about the zealots, people who are, for one reason or another, deter-
mined to give sensitive information to foreign governments, or even to
friendly governments? We are basically all right there as well.
What do we do about the leakers and their henchmen in the
media? I am sure virtually everybody at this symposium knows that
this is a very serious problem. What do you do about an alleged do-
gooder like Ellsberg? You cannot apply the Espionage Act, nor can
you apply a specific atomic energy-type statute. It really cannot be
classified as theft, and even if it is, that does not go to the disclosure.
He did not work for the CIA, so we do not have an employment
contract, as in the Marchetti20 and Snepp situations. In those situa-
tions, you could not enjoin them. What do you do about Woodward?
On October 26, 1987, as many of you know, Insight Magazine
referred to one of the most closely held secrets in American intelli-
gence, "the Special Navy Control Program," which apparently Tur-
17. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 641, 62 Stat. 725 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 641 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
18. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
19. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
20. Victor L. Marchetti, a former CIA employee turned author, unsuccessfully challenged
the constitutionality of the secrecy agreements that he signed when entering and leaving his
employment with the CIA. See United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1972).
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ner gave them. 2' Is there a statute that fits that? I. think not. What do
you do about "Leaky" Leahy when he shoots off his big mouth about
the Achille Lauro and some sensitive operations in Egypt? How do
you deal with that? I think the way you deal with it is by enlarging
present laws, or by getting new laws enacted to cover unauthorized
disclosures of national security and defense information that are not
currently embraced by these statutes. In other words, leaks by any-
one-including the heretofore specially privileged media-should be,
first, permanently enjoined with substantial financial and other penal-
ties for violation of the injunction, and second, should be punished
criminally.
Obviously, statutes like the one I just proposed have to be drawn
to avoid vagueness problems. They must narrowly define key terms,
such as unauthorized, disclosure, national security, and national
defense. Furthermore, the legislative intent should be very clear.
What do we do about the first amendment? The first amendment
is no bar. In the first place, there cannot be a right to speech or press
that allows affirmative steps to disclose information, which in the
hands of America's enemies, could violate the legitimate rights of
Americans to survive. In other words, there is no right to violate a
right. Second, the Supreme Court never has held that the first amend-
ment is entitled to a privileged position in either the Bill of Rights, or
in the entire constitutional constellation of which the first amendment
and the Bill of Rights are but a part. And third, federal courts have
held, at least in the case of the Rosenbergs,22 that there is no first
amendment right to pass atomic secrets to the Soviets. Indeed, one
can extrapolate that Axis Sally had no right to free speech or free
press to broadcast pro-Nazi, anti-American propaganda for the
Germans, nor did Tokyo Rose for the Japanese, nor Ezra Pound, with
his anti-Semitism, for the Italian Fascists.
In the United States and in the world today, there are many limi-
tations on speech, and though some of us may disagree with some or
all of them, they have been held constitutional and are the law of the
land. Some of these limitations concern infinitely less important
material than national security. Obscenity and hard-core pornogra-
phy laws are limitations on speech. Defamation laws are a limitation
on speech. Laws against dirty words are a limitation on speech. The
doctrine of commercial speech is a limitation on speech. Special envi-
ronment, time, place, and manner restrictions are, likewise, restric-
21. Epstein, Gripping Tale of Struggle for Power, INSIGHT/THE WASH. TIMEs, Oct. 26,
1987, at 61.
22. See Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273 (1953).
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tions on speech. The Hatch Political Activity Act,2 3 which bars
political activity, is a restriction on speech. The Logan Act 24 on free-
lance foreign policy, except when it applies to Congressmen, is a limi-
tation on speech.
National security and national defense issues are related to for-
eign affairs. The foreign affairs power of the Federal Government,
held by Justice Sutherland in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp.25 to be plenary, is especially plenary when the President and the
Congress act jointly. In balancing interests, for those who like to do
that sort of thing, it is not difficult to find a compelling state interest
here.
What about prepublication restraint? In principle, there is noth-
ing constitutionally infirm about a prepublication injunction. The
Supreme Court in Near v. Minnesota,26 does not say that you can
never get one. In fact, in the Pentagon Papers case, Justice Brennan
himself recognized, in principle, the availability of a prepublication
injunction.27 Also, in United States v. Progressive, Inc.,28 which dealt
with the recipe for the atomic bomb, a federal district court issued a
preliminary injunction.
Yes, our laws relating to the disclosure of national security
defense information are inadequate. They must be enlarged to cover
leakers and their arrogant henchmen in the media, who presume to
decide for the American people, who have elected a President and a
Congress, what is in the national interest concerning security. Fur-
thermore, those laws must be vigorously enforced. People like Mori-
son, who give secret photos to a British magazine, should be
prosecuted as he was.29 Those like Agee, who blow the cover of CIA
agents, ought to be tried, not only for the disclosure under the new
statute, but perhaps also for treason, and for being an accessory to
murder, given the death of Mr. Welch in Athens. Mr. Welch, I might
add, no longer has any freedom of speech. The former government
employees and journalists who compromise secret papers and projects
must be indicted, tried, convicted, and sent to prison. The self-serv-
ing, holier-than-thou newsmen, who would jeopardize American
security by exposing a planned Grenada invasion or a hostage rescue
23. Pub. L. No. 87-753, 76 Stat. 750 (1962).
24. Ch. 645, § 953, 62 Stat. 744 (1948) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 953 (1982)).
25. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
26. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
27. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726 (1971) (per curiam).
28. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
29. See United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 109 S. Ct.
259 (1988).
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operation, must be enjoined and severely punished if they violate that
injunction. Our survival in this very dangerous world requires no
less. To paraphrase William Jennings Bryan, it seems to me that we
can no longer allow America's security to be crucified on the cross of
free speech.
II. FLOYD ABRAMS
Each society chooses the risks it is prepared to take. Each soci-
ety chooses most carefully, in the areas of national security and free-
dom of expression, the risks that it is prepared to take in either
direction. As a general matter, this country, more than any other in
the history of the world, has chosen the risks of allowing free speech,
rather than the risks of suppressing it. That is true in almost all areas.
It is certainly true in the area of national security.
I have not the slightest hesitation in telling you that I am contin-
ually confronted with a look that is usually reserved for people who
are slightly mad when I travel abroad and tell people about cases that
I have worked on, or cases that the courts have decided. It is the
received wisdom of the Western world, not only the totalitarian
world, that we have gone much too far, that we do not understand the
value of order, that we should be more concerned than we are about
momentary spasms of public opinion, and that, as Professor Holzer
would have it, we should do something about the press when it pub-
lishes something that Professor Holzer believes it should not. But
Professor Holzer's America is not mine. And the rest of the world's
view is not ours.
Let me urge upon you a few lessons. One is that when people
talk specifically about the harm that will be done, or has been done,
by something that has been published in a newspaper or broadcast on
television, you should be very wary about whether any harm will
actually result. We have, after all, had some experience in this area.
The Pentagon Papers were indeed secret in classification terms. They
were Top Secret documents prepared under the offices of Secretary of
Defense MacNamara in an effort to determine why we entered the
war in Vietnam, and whether we should stay in that war. They were
made available to the New York Times, and ultimately to other news-
papers as well. The argument for a prior restraint failed in that
case.30 The Supreme Court did not say that all prior restraints there-
after would be unconstitutional. It did, however, make it just about
impossible for any prior restraint to be issued, in almost any case that
30. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714.
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we can imagine. The fact that there had been no efforts by the gov-
ernment to seek a prior restraint on national security grounds prior to
1971, and that there had been no such cases since 1971, save the Pro-
gressive case,31 which did not reach the Supreme Court, should tell us
something about how real life works. It should be an indication of
how much harm people think publication can do-indeed, how much
harm it does do. The Pentagon Papers case is only one case, but it is
not a bad test case. There, under oath, the Secretary of the Army
swore to every court in this country that publication of the papers
would do grave and irreparable harm to this nation and its people.
All those papers, which were in the hands of newspapers, were ulti-
mately published, some of them not by the newspapers themselves.
No one has ever tried to argue that any harm came about as a
result of that publication. Ten years after that case, I interviewed
every witness I could find who had testified for the government about
the harm that would befall us as a result of publication.32 None of
them thought that any harm had come about, and one of them, Mr.
Macomber, former Assistant Secretary of State, later Ambassador to
Jordan and other countries, said that he now thought the govern-
ment's position was wrong, even though he thought it should have
brought the case. He thought the Times should have won the case
and said that he had come to the view, more strongly out of govern-
ment than in it, that the first amendment protects our national secur-
ity, as well as always running the risk of imperiling it. I think that
teaches us a lesson about this.
Professor Holzer refers to Mr. Woodward and asks, I hope hypo-
thetically: "What do you do about Woodward?" 33 First, if you are
serious about punishing leakers, you should ask: "What should we do
about the Caseys?" If you mean that you really want to punish and
jail people that leak information, then you have to mean it on a bipar-
tisan basis-whether the people come from the left or the right, and
whether you agree with them or not. Mr. Woodward's book is a good
example of that because no one can read that book and not believe
that the information relied upon in it came from high-ranking officials
in the intelligence establishment of the United States.34
We live in a country all but totally free of prior restraints.35 We
31. Progressive, Inc, 467 F. Supp. 990.
32. See Abrams, The Pentagon Papers a Decade Later, N.Y. Times, June 7, 1981, § 6
(Magazine), at 22.
33. See supra p. 64.
34. See B. WOODWARD, VEIL: THE SECRET WARS OF THE CIA, 1981-1987 (1987).
35. See Abrams, Prior Restraints, PRAC. L. INST. 3 COMM. LAW 5, 11 (1987).
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live in a country which hardly ever punishes speech after it is made3
6
and which rarely-very rarely-imposes liability on third parties who
receive and disseminate information, even when the information was
intended to be secret. 3 Should that be the law? Put aside, for a
moment, the first amendment issues. Should we choose to order a
society in a fashion that lets us, once we have information, use it as we
see fit?
My answer is yes. I think my answer comes from some of the
same roots as the first amendment case law. In part, it is a matter of
practicality. Once secrets are out, they are out. You cannot rebottle
old secrets, nor can you effectively ban the use of information once it
is out of the control of the government, which is trying to prevent its
dissemination. That is exactly what happened in a different part of
the Pentagon Papers case. One newspaper after another got the infor-
mation, and one newspaper after another was briefly enjoined from
printing it. Fortunately, the case ended with a victory for the press.
But for a time we were going down a road similar to the absurd situa-
tion the United Kingdom is in today. The book Spycatcher, 3 which
we can buy at any bookstore in America, and which any Englishman
can bring into England, cannot be printed in the United Kingdom
either in its entirety, or in excerpts. Such an approach does not work
and should not work. Who are we protecting? What are we protect-
ing? We should at least admit that if information is out, we can
assume that our adversaries have access to it. That is not overreach-
ing. You do not need traitors for that, let alone the sadly unreal
world that Professor Holzer urges is upon us. It is common sense, not
barbarism, that leads us to conclude that once something is no longer
a secret, we should not enjoin anyone from printing it.
Some component of freedom of expression should be put on our
public policy scales, as well as those which we use to determine first
amendment law. Are we really prepared to say that if information
becomes available which is relevant to public policy decisions, as a lot
of this information is, we may not use it? Are we really prepared to
say that you will be jailed, or should be jailed, if you disclose such
information to someone else?
Washington lives on leaks. Mr. Willard said in a discussion,
which he and I had some years ago, that it was one of the purposes of
36. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941); see also New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964).
37. See Smith v. Daily Mail Co., 443 U.S. 97, 102 (1979); see also Landmark
Communications, Inc., v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843-45 (1978).
38. P. WRIGHT, SPYCATCHER (1987).
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this administration to end that regime. It has failed. All administra-
tions so far have failed at that effort. I do not condemn them for that.
I simply say that no administration has found it possible to do that for
a variety of reasons, which are deeply imbedded in the American
psyche, and which particularly come to the fore when we do not agree
on basic premises of policy within and without government. To say
that we should jail people who get information from high-ranking
government officials who often have the authority to leak is to nullify
one of the primary means by which the American people learn what is
going on in, or about, their government. Although that is not an
ordered way to run a society, and although it is not the way one
would start out writing law in terms of how society ought to work, it
is the way we have developed for a variety of reasons. It is often the
way information gets out.
I do not oppose criminal laws that punish certain people in gov-
ernment who reveal certain information. I do not object to laws that
result in the firing of other people who are in government and who
leak information. When I hear people ask what we should do about
Woodward, however, my answer is that we should honor him. I
think he has made a serious and substantial contribution to public
debate concerning the most serious public matters that confront us. If
we were drafting a new first amendment, we should draft it to protect
Bob Woodward. If we were drafting a new espionage law, then we
should draft it to ensure that the Woodwards of the world are not
jailed because of what they do.
I conclude by emphasizing to those who really care about per-
sonal liberties that passing legislation that bans, suppresses, or pun-
ishes speech would be profoundly unwise, historically un-American,
and-fortunately-indisputably unconstitutional.
III. RICHARD K. WILLARD
I am happy about the government's record in the Supreme
Court. Recently, we have been winning cases in which the first
amendment and national security interests come into conflict. I
would just like to briefly summarize these cases. The trend started in
1980, during the Carter administration. In Snepp v. United States,3"
the Supreme Court rejected a first amendment challenge by upholding
the Central Intelligence Agency's right to review the unclassified writ-
ings of ex-employees, prior to their publication. The following year,
the Court, in Haig v. Agee,' again rejected a first amendment chal-
39. 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
40. 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
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lenge and upheld the ability of the government to revoke Mr. Agee's
passport because of his activities. Then, several years later, in Regan
v. Wald,' the Court rejected another first amendment challenge and
upheld government regulations which inhibited travel to Cuba.
I had the pleasure of representing the government in Central
Intelligence Agency v. Sims. 42 This was a Freedom of Information
Act case, in which the Court upheld the ability of the Director of
Central Intelligence to withhold information about intelligence
sources, even though it was unclassified. Then, in 1985, the Court
upheld the power of military commanders to bar people from open
houses who wanted to demonstrate on a military base.43 The Court
further upheld the ability of the government to engage in a prosecu-
tion policy that targeted people who had protested against the Mili-
tary Selective Service Act by refusing to register with the Selective
Service." Finally, there was Meese v. Keene,45 the "Canadian films"
case, in which the Supreme Court upheld the ability of the govern-
ment to compel foreign films to be registered if they met the criteria
for the statutory term "political propaganda."
The only case in which the government has had a problem in this
area recently was Abourezk v. Reagan.' We lost that case in the
court of appeals, and it was affirmed by an equally divided Court-
three to three, with three members of the Court absent.4" I am not
sure, however, that the case really stands for much of anything, in
light of the limited participation of the Court.
It is significant that the Court's decisions have not been close in
these national security cases. Only one of them, Regan v. Wald,4" was
a five to four case, and there, the four dissenters based their dissent
solely upon statutory grounds. Most of these cases were decided
seven to two, or six to three. In fact, the only Justices to vote against
the government's position in all seven of the cases were Justices Bren-
nan and Marshall. Justices Stewart, O'Connor, Burger, White, and
Rehnquist voted for the government in all of the cases in which they
participated. Justice Powell voted for the government in six out of
seven of these cases, while Justices Stevens and Blackmun voted for
41. 468 U.S. 222 (1984).
42. 471 U.S. 159 (1985).
43. United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985).
44. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
45. 481 U.S. 465 (1987).
46. 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 252 (1987) (per curiam).
47. Reagan v. Abourezk, 108 S. Ct. 252 (1987) (per curiam), aff'g 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C.
Cir. 1986).
48. 468 U.S. 222 (1984).
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the government in five out of seven. Overall, the government has a
clear record of success in litigating first amendment cases involving
national security issues in the Supreme Court.
Perhaps I ought to be content, but the fact is that I am very
unhappy about the state of our government's ability to protect
national security information. A few years ago, I was hopeful that the
Reagan administration could change the traditional Washington pat-
tern of rampant leaks, in which national security was constantly being
compromised by the flow of unauthorized information to the media. I
now recognize that we have failed miserably in protecting vital
national security secrets. Consequently, the rampart leaks have
caused great damage to our intelligence programs and capabilities,
thereby, making it harder for us to conduct diplomatic activities, and
endangering the lives of American servicemen around the world.
I would like to focus on one particular harm because this is one
that I predicted and, unfortunately, have been here long enough to
say "I told you so." It is the harm to the decisionmaking process. We
were told that in planning for the Iranian hostage rescue mission, the
Carter administration had a fear of leaks that kept the planning to
only a tight circle. As a result, they could not take advantage of
expertise that might have helped the mission succeed. The people
who had the expertise and could have been helpful, were kept out of
the process because the administration was afraid that if they involved
too many people, there would be a leak.49 That led to the foreign
policy fiasco of the Carter administration. Unfortunately, the same
fear led to the foreign policy fiasco of the Reagan administration. I
am referring to the Iran-Contra affair. The Tower Commission
Report makes the point quite well:
The obsession with secrecy and preoccupation with leaks
threaten to paralyze the government in its handling of covert oper-
ations. Unfortunately, the concern is not misplaced. The selective
leak has become a principal means of waging bureaucratic warfare.
Opponents of an operation kill it with a leak; supporters seek to
build support through the same means.
We have witnessed over the past years a significant deteriora-
tion in the integrity of process. Rather than a means to obtain
results more satisfactory than the position of any of the individual
departments, it has frequently become something to be manipu-
lated to reach a specific outcome. The leak becomes a primary
instrument in that process.
49. See infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
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This practice is destructive of orderly governance.
50
That is a fair comment on the bureaucratic climate that helped to
contribute to the Iran-Contra fiasco. The question is what do we do
about it. Some suggest that we should give up and recognize that leaks
are an inevitable phenomenon of Washington; however, I do not think
that is an adequate solution. Those of us who are in government
would be abdicating our responsibility to safeguard the national
security if we were to tolerate a situation in which our government
could not keep a secret when it counted.
I also do not think that the first amendment has much to do with
the solution. In my view, the solution requires painstaking work on
the fundamentals of security. Success in government is like success in
invention--one percent inspiration, and ninety-nine percent perspira-
tion. Success here, especially in the national security area, is about
ten percent policymaking and ninety percent policy effectuation.
We need to have a balanced program to develop a security pos-
ture that pays attention to all the fundamentals. In my view, there are
five areas: first, a sound classification system; second, a personnel
security system that works properly to limit access to those who are
trustworthy; third, a program for protective security to limit access to
information to those who are in fact authorized to have it; fourth, a
counterespionage program; and fifth, an enforcement program to pun-
ish, and hopefully deter, those who are violators of the system.
Although we have made some progress in many of these areas in
the Reagan administration, we simply have not made enough progress
in the last area. It is not really a matter of developing new legal weap-
ons, but an ability to use the ones we have. The most celebrated
defeat for the government in this area involved the effort to obtain
prepublication restraint through an injunction in the Pentagon Papers
case.5 That is not what we needed to solve our problem. I am will-
ing to accept the challenge that was laid down by Justices Stewart and
White in that case. They emphasized that it is the responsibility of
the executive branch to enforce secrecy by having a sound security
program and to punish and fire people who violate their trust.2
It is in the area of executive branch programs that the fight is
going on right now. For example, our efforts to get employees to sign
secrecy agreements are now under attack in lawsuits, in the media,
and in Congress. Some in Congress think that "whistle blowers"
50. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL REVIEW BOARD (Tower Commission), part
v, 5-6 (Feb. 26, 1987).
51. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
52. Id. at 729 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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ought to be protected if they disclose classified information. There is
a recent proposal to let the Merit Systems Protection Board, which
has no security responsibilities, review a decision by the Executive to
deny access to classified information.
I am willing to accept the challenge of the courts and the schol-
ars, who assert that national security information should be protected
in a manner consistent with the first amendment, by focusing on the
Executive's responsibility to get its own house in order. We cannot do
that, however, if our critics continually undermine such efforts. If we
are to succeed, or have any hope of success, we must pull together and
focus on implementing a sound security program. If our critics pre-
vent us from enforcing security requirements within the executive
branch, then I think the only other alternative is some kind of Official
Secrets Act. I do not think that is a good idea, and many of our
critics may regret undermining our efforts to develop a sound security
regime because the alternative may be much worse from the stand-
point of the first amendment.
IV. DON OBERDORFER
I want to tell you how a member of the press feels about these
issues as a person who has to deal with them on a day to day basis, in
a mundane or occasionally dramatic fashion. First, I would like to
make a disclaimer: No one can speak for the American press. It is
diverse in character and opinion. I speak for myself, not for the press,
and not for the Washington Post. We, as journalists, deeply believe in
the first amendment, which is the foundation of what we do. It is of
primary importance to us that the press is the only business in this
country- and it is a business-that is protected by the Constitution
of the United States. There is a reason of great significance for this. In
our democratic system, a free people would be unable to effectively
exercise their citizenship rights if they were not well and indepen-
dently informed, or at least did not have the potential of being well
and independently informed. Our function as members of the press is
to inform them.
The press lives by disclosures. Our job is to tell as much as we
can, as well as we can, and as often as we can. This is not, as you may
think, a special pleading for a special cause. If you think about it for a
moment, the governmental and the political processes at local, state,
and national levels rely to a tremendous extent on this constant
stream of public and published information. It is the foundation for
political interchange, accountability, and public opinion. The inde-
pendence and the diversity of the press are, therefore, of vital impor-
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tance. If you need a reminder, just visit an authoritarian or
totalitarian country, look at the press, and you will see the difference.
Despite the tenor of what I have just said, and some of what I will say
next, the general public and many of us in the business believe that
our greatest fault is in not finding out and publishing enough. There
is much less concern that we may publish too much because it is man-
ifestly true that there is so much that we do not know and report.
We in the press may seem like many, but from our ranks, we
appear as a very thin line trying to cover a vast amount of territory.
What we learn about security matters is often partial and after-the-
fact. We are faced not only with secrecy, but often with lies, half-
truths, evasions, and recently, attempts at deliberate misinformation.
The Iran-Contra affair is an example of our shortcomings. We knew
nothing about it for more than a year, despite major discussions and
decisions within the government, and despite large scale movements
of money, weapons, and emissaries around the world. The affair also
reveals the dangers inherent in obsessive secrecy, which leads to unac-
countable government operations beyond the tolerance of Congress,
or the American public.
Most of us in the press also recognize that in compelling and
unusual circumstances, there are limits to what we can, or should,
publish. We are not totally independent actors or institutions. We
are also citizens. Generally speaking, we do not publish the names of
rape victims, nor do we generally interfere with the tactical phase of
law enforcement or military operations. In Vietnam, for example,
reporters, myself included, accepted ground rules not to disclose
pending military operations.
How then do we deal with the disclosure of government secrets
or pseudo-secrets? I mention the latter because in my experience,
nearly every action, recommendation, or policy decision in the foreign
policy or national security field is classified as a secret by someone at
some time, often without valid reason, except for bureaucratic con-
venience. Howard Simons, former Managing Editor of the Washing-
ton Post, often said that it is not just improbable, it is impossible for a
person to report on the foreign policy beat in Washington without
bumping into a secret every day.
The abuse of secrets is far more serious on the government side
than in the press. Although a lot has been-said about leaks, much of it
is total nonsense. We have to decide what a leak is. A great deal of
information comes out of the government every day with no name
attached to it. This is not a leak. For example, the Institute of Poli-
tics of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard con-
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ducted a study5 3 about the press and government managers, in which
the authors defined leaks as government sources telling a reporter
something they would not want their boss to know they told him.-
4
After much research, that definition was finally the best one that the
study could come up with. The study also found that forty percent of
former senior government officials said that, at one time or another,
they had leaked information for their own reasons, which they found
to be valid."
Some disclosures of important matters raise legitimate and sub-
stantive questions for the press in this field because of the potential
consequences of publication. We usually know which ones these are.
I am not talking about the Aviation Week type of technical material,
which the government could stop if it wanted to. I am talking about
major policy issues. Generally speaking, there is also a dialogue
between the government and the press before publication. This is an
ad hoc, informal system that has developed over time, especially since
this has become an issue between the government and the press over
the last ten years.
Some of the most notable examples from my own experience on
the Washington Post were Bob Woodward's 1977 disclosure that King
Hussein of Jordan had long been on the CIA payroll;56 Mike Getler's
1980 disclosure of U.S. aid to the Afghan rebels; 57 my 1982 disclo-
sure, followed by a more extensive one by Bob Woodward and Pat
Tyler, regarding President Reagan's authorization of U.S. aid to an
anti-Sandinista force in Nicaragua, which later became known as the
Contras;5" and Woodward's 1985 discovery, published in the Post
eight months later, of U.S. eavesdropping operations off the Soviet
coast, which had been revealed to the Soviets prior to that time, for
pay, by government employee Ronald Pelton.59
In each of these cases, the government was put on notice by the
newspaper and had an opportunity to make its views known if it
objected to publication. In most of the cases, a high level dialogue
ensued that sometimes involved such figures as the President, the Sec-
retary of State, the National Security Adviser, the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, or the National Security Agency, and
the publishers and editors of the newspaper. In these dialogues, the
53. M. LINSKY, IMPACT (1986).
54. Id. at 202.
55. Id. at 197-98.
56. The Wash. Post, Feb. 18, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
57. The Wash. Post, Feb. 15, 1980, at 1, col. 2.
58. The Wash. Post, Mar. 10, 1982, at 1, col. 5.
59. The Wash. Post, May 21, 1986, at 1, col. 2.
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government figures had an opportunity to state their objections or
misgivings and to spell out the reasons against publication of the
information, either in whole, or in part, or for a certain period of time.
The press, in this case the Washington Post, had an opportunity to
point out surrounding facts and circumstances and state its views to
the government. Yet, the decisions of whether to publish, when to
publish, and how much to publish were ultimately for the press to
make.
This is an essential point. If it were not our final decision, there
would be no such process, simply a flat and nearly automatic "no," as
under the British Official Secrets Act, or the workings of authorita-
rian or totalitarian governments in many places in the world. It
would be a resounding and ever-encroaching "no," which would
likely do far more damage to the United States political and govern-
mental system over time than any disclosure of the moment. In the
same vein, it seems to me that nearly all of the proposed remedies for
governmental leaks, such as the application of espionage or theft laws
to leaks by the press, would dangerously interfere with the press' abil-
ity to function in our system.
The government has the right and the duty to protect its secrets
against unauthorized disclosure. That is its job. Indeed, I find Mr.
Willard's program of painstaking and hard work on the essentials of
security to be a legitimate government effort. And his suggestions
sound to me, at first hearing, like they are the kind of action that the
government should take to protect its secrets.' It should take such
action, however, without threatening or damaging the press' right and
duty to inform the public. Blunderbuss measures that have not been
approved by Congress, or justified to the American people, are not the
way to go.
The functioning of the press is essential to our democratic sys-
tem. Our shortcoming is our inability to know enough and publish
enough. Our job is to publish. In extreme, compelling, and unusual
circumstances, however, there may be overriding reasons to withhold
publication of information. Freedom of the press is a balancing act,
not an absolute right, although the weight should be heavily on the
side of publication. In fact, an informal, ad hoc system has been
developed that allows stories that are seen as particularly troublesome
for the government on national security grounds to be discussed
before they are published. The system works, and I might add that
there has been no showing of grave damage to U.S. national security
when it has been used. Finally, the ultimate decision to publish is,
60. See supra Section III.
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and must be, in the hands of the press. If we are wrong, there will be
severe public and political consequences. Publishers, editors, and
reporters are well aware of that. We live here too.
V. REBUTTAL STATEMENTS
A. Henry Mark Holzer
We hear a great deal, particularly from liberals, about how activ-
ity A, law B, or decision C, may "chill" free expression. We never
hear, however, the very related point that there is also a fear of leaks.
Speaking broadly, there is the fear that sensitive, classified, and highly
important national security and national defense information may get
out and cast a terrible chill on planning activities that are important
to American national interests.
Mr. Oberdorfer said that the press is the only business protected
by the Constitution.6" I would suggest that the "business" of survival
is very much protected by the Constitution in provisions that, among
others, provide Congress with the authority to provide for the
national defense. Not to introduce a note of acrimony, but I am
becoming very tired of hearing that the first amendment is virtually
the only provision in the American Constitution. There are provi-
sions in the body of the Constitution that are of equal, if not greater,
importance than the one that supposedly creates a right to express
"information" to the effect that the American military is planning to
liberate Grenada.
B. Floyd Abrams
I would like to give this administration credit for some of the
things it has not done. It is meaningful, and it says something about
the strength of our tradition, the force of our laws, and the commit-
ment of the people in this administration to the first amendment that
there have been no efforts at prior restraint by this administration,
and that there have been no criminal prosecutions of journalists by
this administration. For those of us, myself included, who have been
critical of the administration, it is worth saying that these things have
not occurred, and it is important that they have not occurred.
The battle is now being fought a number of steps away from the
hard core, first amendment terrain. It is being fought about the rights
of leakers. There is no constitutional right to leak information. On
the other hand, there is a first amendment interest in having certain
information available. What should the rights of a whistle blower be?
61. See supra p. 74.
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As a societal matter, and not as a first amendment matter, I think that
it is extremely important for us to encourage people to disclose
wrongdoing in government. I am not here, however, to argue that
now. Rather, I would argue that this administration is obsessed with
secrecy. It is worth saying again, at least as a very general and very
real life proposition, that the reason we have so little litigation in these
hard core areas is that we always have shared the view that direct
restraints and punishment of the press, of speakers, and the like is
unacceptable.
It is worth discussing one or two more examples of the sort of
"secrets" that are published, and that people may object to having
published. Mr. Woodward's book, for example, disclosed, I think for
the first time, details about the bombing of a Nicaraguan airport just
before two American Senators arrived.62 That bombing was done, as
Mr. Woodward suggests, and I believe it to be true, in a fashion that
was supported by the Central Intelligence Agency. There are serious
questions about illegal actions by the CIA in Nicaragua. Even if Mr.
Woodward's statement was not true, there are serious public policy
questions about whether that sort of thing should have gone on, and
about the degree to which this government should have been
involved. So far as I am concerned, it is a good thing, not a bad one,
that that sort of disclosure was made.
A second example is an assassination attempt in Beirut that Mr.
Woodward said was made on behalf of the United States. 6a Although
the target of the attempt was not killed, some seventy or eighty other
people were. I would make the same two points. First, assassination
is illegal, and if we try to do it on behalf of this government, it is
against the law. That does and should matter to us. Second, and
more broadly, there are serious issues of public policy involved there.
This is not a question of what the press should do in advance of a
rescue effort, or what the press should do in advance of an invasion,
or even what the press should do in advance of an assassination
attempt, if that should occur. This is reporting, and I believe that it is
important, serious, and valuable reporting. It is information that is
"classified," but the classification system does not bind you, me, or
the press. It cannot, and it never has bound anyone except govern-
mental officials.
The government has a perfect right in the two examples above
not to speak. Indeed, the government might have violated its duty to
its citizens if it had done so. But although the government is within
62. B. WOODWARD, supra note 34, at 271-76.
63. Id. at 397.
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its legal rights not to disclose these matters, the press is not only
within its legal rights but, in my view, serves the public by disclosing
them.
C. Richard K Willard
The debate in Washington is not over government efforts to put
newspaper reporters in jail, or to engage in direct censorship of the
press. Rather, it is about the government's efforts to get its own house
in order, to have a good security system that will work, and to find
government employees who are violating the security rules and pun-
ish them appropriately.
That is where the battle is being fought, and it is a little disingen-
uous for some people to say: "You should get your own house in
order, rather than go after the press." Then, they attack you for
doing precisely what they suggested. That is where we are now.
We have been repeatedly criticized for trying to implement ade-
quate security measures. They say that we cannot use polygraphs to
find out whether people are security risks. They say that we cannot
make decisions of security clearance, unless we can justify them with
judicial review. They say that we cannot require secrecy agreements
of government employees as a condition of giving them access to clas-
sified information. Finally, they say we cannot punish government
employees who violate their obligations in this regard. I would sug-
gest that if we fail in these relatively modest efforts at security disci-
pline, then we are going to have to consider draconian kinds of
solutions. I hope that we do not have to do so. I think the more
harsh solutions have constitutional problems, as well as practical
problems.
I wish the administration had confronted this problem more
forcefully in 1984, when efforts were underway to implement NSDD
84,"1 a presidential directive that was aimed, not at the media, but
entirely at internal government security practices. The political heat
got too strong, however, and the administration backed off and effec-
tively abandoned any effort to develop a program to combat leaks.
The abandonment of this effort was one of the factors that led to the
kind of fiasco we had in the Iran-Contra affair. Unless you have a
disciplined system for national security decisionmaking, you are going
to discourage the use of the process.
I would like to close by reading a brief passage from Colonel
64. National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 84. See Presidential Directive on the
Use of Polygraphs and Prepublication Review: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights, 98th Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess. 114 (1983-84).
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Beckwith's book,6 5 which although it speaks of the Carter administra-
tion ten years ago, it could just as easily be said today about Washing-
ton. He said:
Early on in the planning of the mission I was embarrassed to learn
that Delta could not coordinate with our State Department those
contact points we had taken a lot of time and effort to establish.
Because of State's notorious reputation for not being able to keep a
secret, DOD [Department of Defense] ordered Delta not to talk to
State. Somehow this problem with the State Department must be
overcome. In the future, every appropriate agency in our govern-
ment must be used.66
I would suggest that the problem has not yet been overcome.
D. Don Oberdorfer
I do not want my silence about Woodward to be misconstrued,
not that he needs any defense from me. He is one of the most
respected journalists in Washington. He does wonderful, credible
work, which I honor and respect.
VI. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
SPEAKER: Mr. Oberdorfer, You did sound like the soul of
sweet reason, and in fact you were even quite moving when you said,
"We live here too." I must differ, however, with regard to your opin-
ion on self-enforced prior restraint by the press. You have described
the high level negotiations that take place between government offi-
cials and the press regarding national security. Yet, you failed to rec-
ognize that only one of the parties to this dialogue, government
officials, have been elected by the people and investigated by the FBI
concerning their past and loyalties. The other party to this dialogue,
the press, ultimately decides whether to disclose material security
secrets, yet there are no such safeguards built in. The people who
become editors of newspapers, and therefore hold this very important
power in their hands, undergo no such screening. I am wondering
how you would respond to the possibility, just the hypothetical situa-
tion, of a lunatic becoming editor of the New York Times?
MR. OBERDORFER: We are not elected. We know we are
not elected. We realize that the government has many powers and
responsibilities that we do not have. What I have described is reality
concerning many of the sensitive questions that people get excited
65. C. BECKWITh & D. KNox, DELTA FORCE (1985).
66. Id. at 298.
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about. You may find things that are ironic, difficult, or inappropriate
about it, but we are rather practical about it.
If there is something about a story that is so potentially damag-
ing to the security of the United States that we should not publish it,
not publish all of it, or withhold it for a certain period of time, we
think that it makes more sense to find that out before, rather than
after, the article is published. So there is a dialogue. It's for the gov-
ernment to decide how far up the chain of governmental command
that the response should come from. I do not think there is any alter-
native for the press, if it is going to be both a free and responsible
press, other than to carry on this kind of dialogue with the govern-
ment. I do not believe there is much likelihood of a lunatic becoming
editor of the New York Times, Washington Post, or CBS. We have
institutions, and we have ways up the ladder. I do not think that
would ever happen.
SPEAKER: I have two questions for Mr. Willard. First, how
many employees of the Department of Justice have been fired for
unauthorized leaks of information in the seven years that you have
been there, whether it be the leaking of national security or other
secrets? Second, how many political appointees have been asked to
leave or resign, or have been fired, for unauthorized leaks?
MR. WILLARD: The numbers are not very good at all. I know
of only one case involving a Justice Department employee. There
may be others that I just do not know about because I am not in this
business. Early in this administration, William French Smith fired a
United States Attorney in California for an unauthorized disclosure of
classified information. That contrasts favorably with the record of a
number of other departments, where people who have been caught
leaking classified information have been allowed to either keep their
jobs, or steal off silently into the night with their retirement benefits
intact. All too often, this administration has been unwilling to disci-
pline employees, both political appointees and career appointees, who
violate the security rules.
SPEAKER: It seems that your reliance on policing your own
house is a rather hollow remedy. Only one U.S. Attorney was fired
for unauthorized leaks. There must have been many more leaks in
this administration, or in any administration. You have only one per-
son that you can point to?
MR. WILLARD: I understand the problem. With regard to
leaks, of course, most leakers do not advertise who is doing the leak-
ing. The definition we heard earlier is a good definition of a leaker. It
is someone who provides information that he does not want his boss
[Vol. 43:61
1988] FIRST AMENDMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY 83
to know he is providing. Part of the problem is finding out who the
leakers are. A logical way to solve a leak case would be to take the
person who knows something about it and ask him questions. That
person is usually the reporter. The reporter, however, will not tell
you, even if you take him before the grand jury. He will become a
martyr. Therefore, it is very difficult to use traditional criminal inves-
tigative tools to find out who is doing the leaking.
You can solve some of the cases, and we have. Part of our prob-
lem, however, is an unwillingness to impose appropriate sanctions in
those cases where we do catch the leakers. We ought to do a better
job of it. On the other hand, when we do catch them, they should not
be protected from discipline by a whistle-blower law, the Merit Sys-
tem Protection Board, or anything else.
SPEAKER: Mr. Abrams, are there any categories of informa-
tion at all that you would consider to be appropriate for either prior
restraint or post-publication criminal penalties? If so, what standard
would you apply? I would ask the same question specifically with
respect to the following categories of information: weapons systems,
technical aspects of weapons systems, troop movements, pending
invasions, and commercial trade secrets and codes. Finally, what is
your position on whether criminal penalties should be applied to any
member of the press who knowingly causes property to be stolen, or
receives stolen property, and who knowingly publishes it?
MR. ABRAMS: In general, I think that if I were able to reorder
all of this, I would try to make a very short list of the materials that a
member of the press could be punished for publishing. We already
have at least one list created by statute. This list provides penalties
for the publication of certain atomic energy'matters and certain code
matters. Both of those have raised some serious policy issues in our
society. A few years ago, I loosely would have phrased my list to
include certain technological details of weapons systems. Yet, we
should take note of the fact that as technology changes and as arms
control agreements, for example, become more and more dependent
on verification, it becomes more important to be able to talk about
these things. You cannot talk about them without talking about them
technically.
One of the problems I had with NSDD 8467 was my view that
lifetime censorship agreements with government employees would
deprive us of the chance of having people who leave the government
knowing about these technological matters comment on, and deal
67. See supra note 64.
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with them, in a way that is meaningful to us. The idea that NSDD 84
was lifetime in scope was a little too long for me.68 I would also have
to be assured that we would still have the benefit of the views of the
people best able to give them to us. Therefore, as a general proposi-
tion, while I shall agree that there is a small category of materials
that, if published, could appropriately and constitutionally lead to
punishment, we had best draft any such statute very narrowly indeed.
As to prior restraints, that is an even smaller category. In fact, I
am content to live in a regime in which we continue to have our pres-
ent prior restraint law. The prior restraint law we now have is some-
thing of a fraud because it says we can have prior restraints, when the
reality is that our law all but totally bans prior restraints. That is one
of the reasons why I am comfortable with current law. The fact is
that it is very difficult for the government to engage in prior restraint.
If Justice Stewart's opinion in the Pentagon Papers case,69 which is
the most recent national security press case, is the law, or the best
statement of the law, then what is required, at least absent a statute, is
direct proof that publication will surely result in direct, immediate,
and irreparable harm to the country. Justice Stewart's opinion is suf-
fused with first amendment meaning. Under the standard set forth by
him, there is hardly a case in which the government will be able to
prove successfully that it needs a prior restraint. That should be the
law.
We cannot, in any event, rely on prior restraints as a method of
protecting secrets. Not only are they idiosyncratic in the sense that
they can only be used when the government learns prior to publica-
tion of the intention to publish, but the government only learns this
because we live in a society free of prior restraints. Consider the para-
dox. The only way the government can obtain a prior restraint is if it
knows in advance of publication that the press is going to publish
something. The only way the government generally learns this is if the
press calls for comment. But if we lived under a regime of prior
restraint, the press would simply not call for comment. It is not a
good way to keep secrets, it is not a smart way to keep secrets, and it
is a very troubling way to keep secrets. Therefore, there is a list that I
could sign on to, but it is not very long.
SPEAKER: I got the impression that Mr. Oberdorfer agrees
that the government should be able to keep secrets when it can. Is a
68. See Abrams, The New Effort to Control Information, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1983, § 6
(Magazine), at 22.
69. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 727-30 (1971) (Stewart J.,
concurring).
[Vol. 43:61
1988] FIRST AMENDMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY 85
surprise military operation, such as that in Grenada, one of those
areas where you think it is appropriate for the government to keep a
secret if it can?
MR. OBERDORFER: Yes, I do think that it is the right and
responsibility of the government to keep legitimate secrets. That is
their job. My job is something else. With regard to military opera-
tions, I mentioned that I accepted the need for that in Vietnam. I do
not think the American press should publish or broadcast something
in a tactical situation, such as American troops going into battle. I
think to do that would be the height of absurdity.
SPEAKER: As the colloquy has pointed out, this administra-
tion has not stopped leaks. No previous administration has stopped
leaks, and no future administration is likely to stop leaks, for the sim-
ple reason that it is extremely difficult to identify who is doing the
leaking. By contrast, it is relatively easy to identify persons who are
about to publish or disseminate information that already has been
leaked. Therefore, as a practical matter, the only effective way of
reducing leaks to any significant degree may be to reduce the incen-
tive to leak by making it extremely costly to disseminate, publish, or
do anything with the information.
MR. WILLARD: That is not necessarily true. For one thing, it
has been our experience that, for practical reasons, prior restraints are
very unwieldy and ineffective weapons. As the government learned in
United States v. Progressive,'0 during the Carter administration, just
because you get an injunction does not mean that you have protected
the secret.
I do think the government can make progress in identifying
leakers if it uses good investigative techniques without having to
require reporters to disclose their sources. This requires a commit-
ment of resources to do the investigations, and then the backbone to
follow up and fire people, or impose some other kind of heavy penalty
for violating the rules. This must be done, regardless of whether they
are career or political appointees. It is also easier to find the leakers if
you use the polygraph, as the Carter administration discovered in the
Abscam leak probe.
Many of these security measures are controversial. An effort to
cut back on leaks and improve our security posture would pay off in
the future, but the administrative and political costs must be incurred
now. It means that an administration must have enough foresight to
recognize the necessity of investing political capital in a program to
70. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
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prevent future problems from occurring. That is always a very diffi-
cult concept to sell in Washington, when the focus is usually this
afternoon's deadline for the evening news.
PROFESSOR HOLZER: If you cannot get prior restraints on
the recipient of the leak, you can still nail the one who uses it, and
perhaps discourage him or others in the future from using leaked
material, thus drying up some of the leaks. I do not agree with the
theory that if you obtain the information, you can use it. That is a
notion comparable to getting good title from a thief.
MR. WILLARD: I believe in using criminal statutes to prose-
cute fences, whether they are fences of stolen property, or fences of
stolen information. The press, however, faces the difficulty that in
many cases they do not know whether they are, in fact, receiving sto-
len goods. There are few cases where you can prove that a journalist
is knowingly receiving stolen property, and where it may be appropri-
ate to impose liability under criminal law. In most situations, the
responsibility really should be put on the government official who vio-
lates his oath of office and the trust of the American public in disclos-
ing the information.
MR. ABRAMS: There is a major issue as to whether the gov-
ernment owns the information. I start with the proposition that,
absent some extraordinary circumstance, the press is free to use infor-
mation it receives. People in the government, however, are different.
They have different obligations.
SPEAKER: It is my recollection that the condition for imposing
a prior restraint is direct, immediate, and irreparable harm. I believe
that immediacy is an unfortunate, excessive, and undesirable limita-
tion. Surely, the government has not only weapons technology, but
military documentation developed over many years, composed of the
characteristics of billions of dollars worth of equipment. Disclosure
of such technology may not result in immediate harm to the United
States, but certainly, should be enjoinable by prior restraint. If not,
that rule of law is unwise, just as Brandenburg v. Ohio71 is unwise in
holding that advocacy of the violent overthrow of the United States
Government cannot be restrained, unless it is directed to producing
imminent lawless action, and is likely to produce it.
PROFESSOR HOLZER: I do not think that you can find a
clear-cut majority, or even plurality,, opinion in the Pentagon Papers
case.72 It is a short per curiam opinion of three paragraphs.7 3 Subse-
71. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
72. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
73. Id. at 714.
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quently, six Justices went off on frolics and detours of their own.
Consequently, I am not sure what is the law there.
MR. ABRAMS: The usual way that most practicing lawyers
determine the law is to pick the concurring opinion that affords the
least protection to the press, and to say that at least the press has that
protection. In the Pentagon Papers case, which was decided in 1971,
and was the last case that the Supreme Court decided on the issue of
whether the government may obtain a prior restraint, the concurring
opinion that provided the press with the least amount of protection
was the Stewart-White opinion.74 The most important word in that
formulation is the word "immediate. ' 75 There is also no more impor-
tant word in the Brandenburg opinion, with which I agree, than the
word "imminent.
'76
Previously, I focused on the word "surely," but surely what?
The words "surely" and "immediate" are what makes it so very diffi-
cult to overcome the first amendment rights. I disagree with the
thrust of the questioner, although I think his question is acute. If you
have to prove that publication of something will result, let alone
surely result, in some immediate harm of enormous damage, it is very
unlikely that you are going to be able to do it.
The question, if we are talking about policy now, is whether the
test should be that hard? I think it should. Anything less than that
will inevitably result in a series of speculative assumptions by govern-
ment officials who are deferred to by judges, and will be deferred to by
judges on the grounds that these officials have greater expertise on the
effects of publication.
PROFESSOR HOLZER: The difference between the Pentagon
Papers case and the Progressive case at the district court level relates
to the fact that the Government in the Pentagon Papers case was not
able to rely on a statute in seeking that injunction.77 In the Progres-
sive case,7" there was the Atomic Energy Act, 7 9 and it was very clear
that the district judge could rely on it. Therefore, if we could promul-
gate a statute that gave more latitude to these things, we might see a
different result in another Pentagon Papers-type case.
SPEAKER: It has been said that the publication of the Penta-
gon Papers and other such leaks have not caused any harm. Several
harms, however, have been suggested, such as the harm to the deci-
74. Id. at 727-30.
75. Id. at 730.
76. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449.
77. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
78. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990.
79. Ch. 1073, § 230, 68 Stat. 959 (1954) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2280 (1982)).
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sionmaking process. Another is the harm that results from the refusal
of other governments to cooperate with the United States in future
diplomatic, foreign relations, or military matters. Is this a serious
concern? Do you have any reason to believe that this is another
potential problem with these type of leaks, and that this is a potential
concern that should be addressed in the law?
MR. WILLARD: That is a legitimate concern. There are addi-
tional problems posed by the leaks, including the budgetary impact.
The fact is that a leak can compromise a very expensive intelligence
system on which we have spent millions or billions of dollars, and
which becomes worthless as a result of the leak. The problem you
suggest about international cooperation is also valid. It is difficult to
quantify that kind of problem because, in most cases, you do not
know what you are losing as a result of your poor security posture.
MR. OBERDORFER: There is a problem for the government,
but it is easily overblown. Henry Kissinger said that the Pentagon
Papers leak was so devastating to U.S. contacts overseas that we
could not have decent relations, for example, with China. Well, we
have fine relations with China. In fact, we have had all kinds of coop-
eration with China. It is easy to theorize about the terrible things that
are going to happen in some particular case because of a leak, but it
usually turns out to be wrong.
SPEAKER: Let us suppose that first amendment case law and
the journalistic practice of editors and reporters deferring to the judg-
ments of government officials on national security were in the same
state today as they were in the late 1950's and the early 1960's. Let us
also suppose that, as a result of this, we did not have Leninist regimes
in Indochina, Afghanistan, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Nic-
aragua. Mr. Abrams, would you prefer to have that situation, or the
one that we have today?
MR. ABRAMS: That is the strangest choice I have ever had to
make. I cannot understand a question that asks whether I would
rather have a system of cooperation, and sometimes collaboration,
between the press and the government as it existed at a time before
the government started lying to the press and the public on a consis-
tent day-by-day basis about the progress and the nature of the war in
Vietnam, on the one hand, and the absence of Leninist governments
on the other hand. I would wish that Leninist governments did not
exist, but I would never wish for a return to the days of the 1950's or
1960's, in terms of the nature of press coverage of government. One
of the reasons why those days of press-government cooperation ended
was that the press could no longer trust the government to tell the
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truth. If that cooperation had not ended, I do not know what would
have happened, but I do not think that it would have impacted on the
Leninist state in the countries you mentioned.
SPEAKER: I take it that you are saying that the government
was lying on a more consistent and more outrageous basis under the
Johnson administration than under the Eisenhower administration.
MR. ABRAMS: That is correct.
SPEAKER: If the Reagan administration and the next adminis-
tration were, in your view, as truthful as you think the Eisenhower
administration was, would you urge journalists to become less adver-
sarial than they are today?
MR. ABRAMS: I keep my clients by not giving them advice on
journalism. If they really wanted to know my political view, however,
I would say that if the government could be trusted more, the press
would not need to be as adversarial as it is sometimes. My own view
is that the press is not adversarial enough, and that we would be bet-
ter served by a press even more adversarial than the one we have now.
SPEAKER: Mr. Willard, you mentioned the loyalty oath that
the administration wanted government employees to sign so that they
would not leak classified materials. On its face, that would seem fine.
There have been times in the past, however, and there will be times in
the future, when the classified stamp is abused in order to cover up
either the administration's embarrassment, or an individual's corrup-
tion. Do you recognize those possible dangers of this loyalty oath
given the importance of not only keeping the Washington Post happy,
but of also keeping our government running as efficiently as possible?
MR. WILLARD: Those are legitimate concerns. President Rea-
gan's executive order ° on classification forbids the use of classifica-
tion to cover-up wrongdoing or embarrassment. In addition, we now
have available mechanisms for getting at that problem, including the
availability of judicial review under the Freedom of Information Act8
to decide whether information has been properly classified, as well as
other mechanisms, such as the office of Inspector General. Therefore,
I do not think it is necessary for people who confront that phenome-
non in government to resort to self-help through leaks, in order to
obtain redress.
Furthermore, the decision about what is, or is not, proper is not
one that should always be subject to the lowest common denominator
of disclosure by anyone who feels like doing so. There are frequently
80. Exec. Order No. 12356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874 (1982).
81. Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 552, 80 Stat. 383 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552
(1982 & Supp. H 1984)).
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disagreements about whether something is properly classified. Those
should be addressed by an orderly process, rather than on an ad hoc
basis by leaks.
SPEAKER: The review process sometimes involves the very
people who may be covering up either embarrassment, or corruption,
does it not? In fact, there has been corruption in the Inspector Gen-
eral's office, and even at the state level. Looking at just the federal
level, there is the danger that as government grows, by its very nature
it becomes more intrusive and oppressive, and it is harder to get the
truth out of the government. Sometimes the lower levels are the best
source, that is, the government worker who has integrity and is con-
cerned about the quality of the government that the people are
receiving.
MR. WILLARD: It depends on what your perspective is. We
have heard different ones here. My own perspective is that our gov-
ernment keeps far too few secrets, rather than far too many. My
experience is that almost nothing stays a secret, or it does not stay a
secret for long. If you tell more than one other person, and sometimes
if you tell just one other person, you might as well go ahead and pub-
lish it. Those few instances where we are able to keep something
secret are far too rare, rather than too common.
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